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FAA's Fairy Tale By Fred Chesbro Recently, the Federal Aviation Administration basked in such headlines as, "Emery Bows to the Federal Aviation Administration" and "FAA's Stance Against Emery Shows Tough New Emphasis."  On the heals of numerous publicly-aired debacles (e.g., Fine Air in 1997 and then ValuJet in 1998), and saddled with the image of an agency prone to inaction, senior FAA leaders surely relished their decision to pounce swiftly all over Emery Worldwide Airlines. On Aug. 13, the FAA issued its ultimatum --- Emery "would immediately cease operating its fleet of 37 aircraft" that would remain grounded until fully resolving "safety issues arising from past FAA inspections." In its press release, the FAA represented itself as reigning in a carrier brazenly out-of-compliance with "more than 100 apparent violations of the Federal Aviation Regulations."  Ahhh, such refreshing press coverage for the oft-beleaguered agency, even recently described as "crippled under the weight of its own bureaucracy." But, now demanding immediate response and complete compliance by Emery, the FAA was viewed as decisive and bold. Alas, it was just a fairy tale. Apparently the agency has learned a thing or two about being media savvy since the days of ValuJet. On Feb. 16, 2000, Emery Worldwide Airlines flight 17, a Douglas DC-8, took off with 31 tons of cargo on a flight from Sacramento to Emery's hub in Dayton, Ohio. Two minutes later the heavy four-engine jet plowed into an auto salvage yard that quickly became engulfed in a massive fuel-fed inferno. Although they survived impact forces, none of flight 17's three crew members escaped the ensuing post-crash fire. The National Transportation Safety Board had scheduled two days for its public hearing as part of its on-going investigation into this dramatic air cargo disaster.  It was to be the NTSB's first public hearing on an air cargo-only commercial aviation accident, even though Emery 17 was not the first fatal U.S. cargo airline crash in recent years. A mere two-and-a-half years before Emery 17, another departing DC-8 cargo jet went down. Fine Air flight 101, out of Miami, Fla., in August of 1997, similarly wiped out its entire crew. In both Emery and Fine Air cases, it was by the grace of God that hundreds of individuals were not killed. Had Emery 17 departed on schedule, hundreds would have died -- only a delayed departure prevented the jet from hitting the 300 people in attendance at an auto auction. Had Fine Air 101 departed from the opposite runway, hundreds would have died from the jet crashing into a densely populated region of downtown Miami. The FAA took a beating from the NTSB in the aftermath of Fine Air 101. Although the accident never received a public hearing, in its probable cause determination, the board found the cause of the crash to be the result of "the failure of the FAA to ensure that known cargo-related deficiencies were corrected at Fine Air." Given these two tragic events, and because air cargo is the fastest growing segment of the commercial airline industry, it seemed fitting for the board to utilize the public hearing process as part of the Emery 17 investigation. Due to the large number of accidents, the NTSB is unable to conduct public hearings for each and every one.  These hearings serve a number of purposes beyond their fact-finding function. In addition to providing a public accounting for the government's role in enhancing transportation safety, the hearings also serve to heighten awareness of timely and particularly important safety related concerns to targeted government and industry audiences. For the past 18 months, groups made up of relatives of the Emery and Fine Air flight crews, as well as recognized safety advocacy organizations, such as the National Air Disaster Alliance Foundation, have pressed the NTSB to conduct its public hearing on Emery 17 in a timely manner.  In November 2000, the board voted to conduct the hearing. Three weeks before the hearing was set to begin, the NTSB announced the "major issues" to be examined at the hearing centered on contract maintenance and oversight by both "airline and FAA personnel." Recall, these were the very same issues (nearly word-for-word identical) by which the NTSB blasted the FAA in the aftermath of ValuJet. In fact, in its probable cause determination of the ValuJet accident that took more than 100 lives, the board specifically listed as a contributing factor "the failure of the FAA to adequately monitor ValuJet's heavy maintenance programs" and contract maintenance. Prior to the crash of Emery 17, then, the FAA was placed on notice regarding the dismal and unsafe conditions plaguing third party heavy maintenance programs and contract maintenance.  ValuJet was an embarrassment to the FAA, and from all indications as it approached the Emery 17 hearing, the agency was bracing itself to receive yet another black eye for its own role in yet another fatal air accident. It is no secret the FAA expected a bashing at the Emery hearing. The Los Angeles Times reported on a meeting of 20 top FAA officials in July 2000. According to the article, Tom McSweeny, then an associate FAA administrator, referred to his concern over the public's perception that it takes a major accident before the FAA addresses a safety concern. He reportedly said that "the (Air) Alaska hearing will be our Congress telling us that we're not doing out job. That will be the message ... on Emery." In the weeks leading up to the now postponed Emery hearing, it became clear that the NTSB was not pleased with FAA regulators. A recent New York Times article reported that "although the immediate cause of the ValuJet crash was hazardous cargo, a deeper problem was ValuJet's failure to supervise a maintenance contractor and the FAA's failure to supervise either the airline or the maintenance firm." In that same article, NTSB Board Member John Goglia was quoted as saying that the Emery 17 accident "has a number of similarities to ValuJet," and "we went through this drill already, why are we back here again? What happened that they didn't get the message?"  As the NTSB's presiding officer at the now infamous ValuJet public hearings, Goglia of all people is in a position of justified frustration. He is now slated to preside at the NTSB's public hearing on Emery 17. The facts that signal most clearly the FAA's failure regarding Emery 17 also appear the most disturbing. In a series of communications made by Emery's own crew members in the months leading up to Emery 17, forceful pleas for additional regulatory oversight were made to local and national level FAA officials. These documented requests by the Emery's pilot group placed top FAA officials squarely on notice and provided ample evidence that but for regulatory interference, a catastrophic event such as Emery 17 was inevitable.  References to these communications have surfaced in the media in recent months and suggest the agency's image may yet suffer more from its bumbling in the Emery matter than it did in the aftermath of either Fine Air or ValuJet. In a letter to the FAA, Captain Tom Rachford, then of Emery and now Executive Vice President for the Air Line Pilot's Association, wrote, "our maintenance has dramatically fallen off over the last six to eight months. ... I can't say it any clearer: This airline is going to put a hole in the ground and kill someone. Please don't let this fall upon deaf ears." Just five months before the fatal crash of Emery 17, Rachford, pleaded yet again with the FAA "in the hopes of gaining more oversight from the government authorities."  He wrote: "Emery Worldwide Airlines is out of the regulator's eye. ... The present [FAA] (has) little or no support to police an airline the size of Emery." His letter also asked, "Why are the authorities continuing to turn a blind eye?" To operate, an airline must have management that is approved by the FAA, meet financial obligations -- such as providing enough funds to operate and repair aircraft. And finally, be willing to comply with the Federal Air Regulations.  Observations by those at the lower echelon of the regulatory agencies have substantiated our concerns that there is much to be questioned. However, it is the upper echelon that appears to be dragging its feet in not calling for at least an inspection. If we have an accident in the near future, the subsequent investigation will show sainthood on the part of ValuJet when compared to Emery Worldwide Airlines. ... Emery crews are living on borrowed time. The FAA did the right thing in grounding Emery, but the timing was wrong -- in fact, the timing was scandalous. The record shows, and is supported even by the FAA's own inspections of Emery prior to February 2000, that the grounding of Emery should have occurred before the Emery 17 accident. By waiting to ground Emery until just 9 days before the public hearing, the FAA successfully derailed the hearing, averted the impending public criticism and avoided being chastised once again for failing to enforce its own directives in the airline industry. After the grounding announcement by the FAA, the Dayton Daily News reported that "both the FAA and Emery Worldwide Airlines say the sudden grounding is the result of what inspectors found during the past 18 months, not because of any new findings." The latest round of inspections, according to The Wall Street Journal, occurred in May and June of this year. This bolsters the proposition that the FAA had grounds to halt EWA's flight operations at a date much earlier than a mere nine days prior to the start of the hearings.  The timing by the FAA and Emery is too convenient and too contrived. Instead of the FAA getting rave reviews for it tough handling of Emery, the FAA should have had its back up against the wall answering questions at the NTSB hearing about why it didn't close Emery down before Emery 17 crashed uncontrollably 18 months ago.  The FAA had failed to respond to clear warnings that Emery was in desperate need of heightened regulatory oversight years before this crash. The FAA did nothing, even when it was squarely placed on notice that a deadly crash would result from continued regulatory neglect.  The FAA told its "fairy tale" to the media with perfect timing. For now it avoided answering why it had dropped the ball by ignoring maintenance and safety deficiencies which predated this crash. It reeks of Teflon politics to be sure. It is egregious at best. It is an affront to the memory of the crew of Emery 17. My brother in law, the captain of Emery 17, and his crew deserved so much more. The FAA and the NTSB now owe the American people an accounting. Fred Chesbro is a professional pilot and the brother-in-law of the captain of the Emery Airlines flight that crashed in Sacramento in February 2000. His address is 9439 Park Hunt Court; Springfield, Va., 22153. His e-mail address is fchesbro@hotmail.com